This paper documents the large cross-country differences in labor institutions that make them a candidate explanatory factor for the divergent economic performance of countries and reviews what economists have learned about the effects of these institutions on economic outcomes. It identifies three ways in which institutions affect economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, and by increasing information, communication, and trust. The evidence shows that labor institutions reduce the dispersion of earnings and income inequality, which alters incentives, but finds equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment. Given weaknesses in the crosscountry data on which most studies focus, the paper argues for increased use of micro-data, simulations, and experiments to illuminate how labor institutions operate and affect outcomes.
At the turn of the 21 st century, questions regarding labor market institutions replaced macroeconomic policy at the center of much policy debate in advanced economies. By ascribing the high unemployment in European Union countries to labor institutions that reduced wage and employment flexibility, the OECD's 1994 Jobs Study (OECD 1994a (OECD , 1994b directed the attention of policy-makers and economists to institutions that mainstream economics had previously viewed as peripheral to aggregate economic performance. The Jobs Study recommended that countries deregulate labor markets to increase flexibility in working time; make wages and labor costs more responsive to market pressures; weaken employment security provisions and unemployment benefit systems; and introduce active labor market policies -training programs, job-finding assistance to workers, subsidies to employers to hire the long-term unemployed, and special programs for youths leaving school.
This perspective marked a giant shift in the attitude of mainstream economics toward labor institutions. From the 1970s through the mid 1980s or so, most economists favored macro-economic explanations and cures for economic problems (recall the battles between monetarist and Keynesian policies). They viewed labor institutions as peripheral to economic performance. In the 1990s, however, the higher employment rate and more rapid productivity growth of the US than of major European countries despite similar "responsible" macro-economic policies directed attention to the possible role of labor market institutions in explaining differences in aggregate economic performance.
How much of the varying economic performance of capitalist economies can reasonably be attributed to labor institutions? Which outcomes do those institutions influence -the distribution of income, allocation of labor across sectors, productivity, inflation, economic growth? Through what channels do institutions affect outcomes?
This essay reviews what economists know about these questions. Section I documents the large cross-country differences in labor institutions that make them a candidate explanatory factor for the divergent economic performance of countries. Section II examines the ways institutions can affect behavior and outcomes by altering incentives, enabling groups to engage in efficient bargaining per the Coase Theorem 1 , and by improving information, communication, and trust. Turning from what labor institutions might do to evidence on what they actually do, Section III shows that labor institutions reduce income inequality but has equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment in the advanced countries on which most research has focused. Section IV considers three possible interpretations of the empirical findings and ways to improve our knowledge of how the institutional "Elephant" affects economic performance.
I. Variation in labor institutions and economic performance among countries
The starting fact for analyzing labor market institutions across countries is that countries evince widely varying institutional arrangements. The list at the outset of the paper can be easily extended:
apprenticeship programs, occupational health and safety rules, defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans; mandated works councils; equal employment legislation; and so on. While economists do not have a single tight definition of an institution, per Justice Potter's famous statement about pornography, they know institutions when they see them, and they see them everywhere.
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Exhibit 1 documents the variety of labor institutions among OECD countries and in the Asian "Tiger" economies. It records quantitative rankings of country labor markets by their market vs 1 The Coase Theorem holds that absent transaction costs, decision-makers will bargain to efficient outcomes regardless of the initial distribution of property rights. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_Theorem 2 The Justice wrote, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it,." http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=378&invol=184 institutional orientation, measures of specific institutional arrangements, and the share of social expenditures in GDP. Column 1 gives the ranking of countries by the market orientation of their labor market from the Fraser Institute's "economic freedom" index. Since the 1980s the Institute has produced an index of economic freedom based on metrics for "personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and protection of person and property" (Fraser Institute, 2003, p 5) . Beginning in 2001 the Institute included six indicators of labor institutions in its economic freedom index for 58 countries. The
Fraser rankings give high rank (low numbers) to countries that rely more on markets, so that the rank1 implies that a country is the leading country in using market forces to set employment, wages, working conditions while a country with rank of, say 57, implies that that country relies greatly on institutions.
The conservative orientation of the Fraser Institute leads it to define economic freedom in a way that privileges the rights of capital compared to the rights of labor. The Institute regards protection of property as contributing to economic freedom but protection of labor as reducing that freedom (on the grounds that protective institutions limit the ability of businesses to make purely market-based decisions).
As a result in 2003 countries with little or no labor protection, such as Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Zambia, and Haiti, ranked at the top of its index of labor market freedom while countries with well developed legal systems to protect workers, such as Germany and Sweden, ranked near the bottom.
3 But, nomenclature aside, the Institute's index measures the market vs institutional orientation of economies in a way that fits with general observation for advanced countries, in that its index places the US higher in reliance on markets than European economies.
Column 2 gives the rankings of countries in the market orientation of their labor market from a very different survey --the Harvard Labor and Work Life Program's Global Labor Survey (GLS). This
Internet-based survey asked union leaders, labor law professors, and other experts around the world to report on the actual situation of labor in their country. Because respondents were generally favorable to 6 labor institutions (Chor and Freeman, 2005) , it provides a useful counterpart to the Fraser index. The rankings in column 2 correspond closely to those in column 1, demonstrating that persons with differing ideological persuasions see the institution/market orientation of economies in analogous ways.
Columns 3-4 turn to measures of union density and collective bargaining coverage. Historically unions have been the major organization representing workers, and collective bargaining has been the main mechanism by which they raise wages. The density data show wide and increasing variation in the percentage of workers in unions among advanced countries. In 1980 the five countries with the highest union density averaged 67.8% while the five countries with the lowest density averaged 18.9%, for a ratio of 3.6 to 1.0. In 2000, the five most unionized countries had an average density of 66.2% while the five least unionized countries had a density of 12.5%, giving a ratio of 5.3 to 1.0 (data from Visser, 2006) .
The percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining in column 4 shows greater variation. In the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Japan, the rate of collective bargaining coverage approximates the rate of unionization, so that declining union density produces commensurate declines in collective bargaining coverage. By contrast, many EU countries extend collective bargaining contracts to all workers and firms in a sector, so that the majority of workers are covered by collective bargaining regardless of union density. This pattern is most striking for France, whose collective bargaining coverage is among the highest in the world despite France having a rate of unionization below that in the US! In 1980 the five countries with the highest level of collective bargaining coverage had 2.8 times the coverage of the five countries with the lowest level of collective bargaining coverage. In 2000, the ratio of coverage in the five most highly covered countries to coverage in the five least covered countries had risen to 4.6.
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Column 5 records OECD measures of employment protection legislation (EPL) -legal rules protect workers against layoffs by requiring sizeable severance pay if the firm lays them off and in many cases require that the firm negotiate with a works council on a social plan for retraining. The exhibit 7 shows that the US and the other Anglo-American countries (UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand) have weak employment protection legislation compared to other advanced economies. (Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, 2007) . The Anglo-American economy with the strongest EPL regulations, Australia, had weaker regulations than the European countries with the weakest protection, Denmark, and Switzerland. The US, which operates in large part by employment-at-will has the lowest EPL score. In the US firms own jobs and can replace workers for any business or other (non-discriminatory) reason.
The last column of Exhibit 1 gives the ratio of government social expenditures to net national income. High shares of national income going to social expenditures imply more extensive welfare states.
The US and Japan have low ratios. The Anglo-American country with the highest social expenditure ratio is the UK, whose spending falls below all of the other countries save Japan and Spain. At the other end of the spectrum the Scandinavian countries have relatively high social expenditure shares of national income.
As a crude statistical test of the difference in labor institutions between the Anglo-American economies and other advanced economies, Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes (2007) calculated t-statistics of differences in the mean values of several measures of labor institutions between the Anglo-American and other advanced countries. Exhibit 2 shows that most of the differences are large and statistically significant. Executives in the Anglo-American countries, for example, report greater control over wages, ability to link pay to productivity; and power over hiring and firing than do executives in the other advanced countries. Similarly, labor practitioners in the Anglo-American countries report a greater tilt toward business in labor market conditions and regulations, in government's attitude in labor disputes provision of employee benefits, and in forming unions than practitioners in the other advanced countries.
Classifying Wage-setting institutions
From the 1970s through the mid 1980s, analyses of labor institutions viewed the aggregate economic outcomes of countries with "neo-corporatist" labor arrangements --centralized wage-setting between peak level national union organizations and employer associations -as superior to outcomes in countries where market forces or decentralized collective bargaining set wages and conditions of work.
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The studies explained the success of centralized bargaining in terms of the ability of national bargainers to adjust readily to aggregate economic shocks, notably the 1970s oil price increases. By contrast, from the late 1980s through the mid 2000s, most studies focused on the superior employment and productivity growth of the US compared to the EU, with due allowance for high employment in Scandinavia.
To measure country wage-setting institutions researchers developed indices of centralization and/or coordination in wage setting. Although these indices relied on limited descriptive data on wage practices and varied among analysts, they gave a roughly similar picture of the role of institutions in wage setting (see OECD Employment Outlook 1997, table 3.4) --one that resembles the pattern in Exhibit 1.
All the indices rate the US as having one of the most decentralized systems of wage-setting and the Scandinavian countries as among the most institution-driven. Analysts have, however, disagreed about the placement of some countries along the institutional/market scale (Kenworthy, 2001) . For instance, some view Japan as "corporatist" on the basis of its Shunto offensive and strong business-government relations; while others view Japan as decentralized on the basis of its enterprise level unionism, bonus pay system, and lack of a centralized bargaining structure or strong government wage-setting regulations. Given Japan's success in overcoming wage and price inflation in the 1970s, whether analysts place Japan as corporatist or liberal colors how one assesses the relation between institutions and outcomes in that period. 5 Another country that has created problems is Switzerland, which has also had good aggregate economic performance.
In ensuing years, the OECD has developed new and improved measures of wage setting and other institutions in OECD countries over time. In 2004 it placed countries' wage setting into five categories reflecting the centralization of bargaining; and into five categories reflecting co-ordination of bargaining.
Both categorizations resemble those in Exhibit 1, albeit with changes over time. Looking at the AngloAmerican economies, the OECD places the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand in the most market determined wage group; Australia in the second most market determined group; and puts Ireland, which sets pay through a national wage pact, into the second most centralized wage-setting group (OECD, 2004, (Erickson and Ichino, 1995) . Taking a different approach, Botero, et al, (2004) Soskice 1990 finds that the categorization of countries changes some generalizations. 6 The six Anglo-American economies averaged 1.8 on the wage-setting centralization scale while the other advanced OECD countries averaged 2.8, where the scaling places lower value on more market-reliant systems. All Chinese Federation of Trade Unions, which is a branch of the government/party rather than an independent union organization, though it may be moving more toward protecting workers in China's new labor market. Neither the ILO, World Bank, nor other organization concerned with economic development has studied labor institutions in developing countries with the depth that the OECD has done for advanced countries. 7 The biggest lacuna is in data for workers in the informal sector, where most developing country employees work, and where the government regulations and traditional unions that underlie most taxonomies are largely irrelevant.
Variation in economic performance among countries
The dependent variables in cross-country analyses of labor market institutions are measures of aggregate economic performance, such as rates of growth of GDP per capita, income inequality, employment and unemployment, productivity growth, inflation, and growth of real earnings. These outcomes have varied greatly among advanced and developing countries over time. Among advanced countries, much attention has been on employment differences between the US and Western Europe and on productivity growth differences between the US and Japan. But, the US aside, there is wide variation in outcomes among other OECD countries. For instance, Ireland more than doubled its GDP per capita from 1979 to 2005 while France increased its GDP per capita more slowly. Spain had 20 plus percent unemployment for two decades while unemployment was low in Japan. In the 1990s through mid-2000s small European Union countries had lower unemployment rates than Germany, France, and Italy, while in the 1990s through the mid-2000s Australia had lower unemployment and more rapid economic growth than New Zealand.
Economic performance has varied even more widely among developing countries (Easterly, et al 1993) . In the 1960s and 1970s Africa had better growth experience than much of Asia, and higher GDP per capita than India or China. In the 1980s through the mid 2000s, China and then India had rapid growth, albeit with different labor institutions and economic and political structures. In the Maoist era, 7 Rama and Artetcona (2002) developed a World Bank labor database for all countries by gathering labor indicators China had essentially no labor market (Walder, 1986) . Labor bureaus assigned jobs to workers in stateowned enterprises. Managers of firms had little right to hire and fire or determine pay. A national grid determined wages. Mobility of labor was restricted to local areas as the need to have hukou residence permits kept potential migrants from moving to the large cities. This situation changed when China began its market reforms so that by the early 2000s, the labor market determined wages and employment. Over the same period, many Latin American economies stagnated, and the share of the work force in informal sector employment grew. Within Latin America, however, some countries did well and others poorly. In Africa, many economies stagnated or deteriorated, though again with considerable cross-country variation.
Research on labor institutions in developing economies has largely focused on the danger that institutional interventions distort market outcomes and reduce growth. The Harris-Todaro model of unemployment and migration attributed high unemployment in African cities to high urban wages resulting from government policies and trade unions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harris-Todaro_Model).
In this analysis, institutions created excessively high wages in urban areas; which in turn drew rural migrants to cities where they would wait unemployed for jobs. In 1990, the World Bank warned countries that institutions designed to improve worker well being in fact harmed those workers: In ensuing years, the accumulation of evidence on these policies led the World Bank to modify its views (World Bank, 1995) but its 1990 statement still represents a widely held perspective.
II. Should Labor Institutions Matter?
The hypothesis that labor institutions are a prime determinant of aggregate economic outcomes is a from various sources into a single place, but the Bank did not pursue an on-going effort to improve the measures. flattering one to specialists in comparative labor analysis. 
Institutions affect outcomes
Standard models in which decision-makers respond to price/wage incentives in market settings
show that responses to institutionally determined incentives can substantially impact distribution and efficiency. Consider the traditional analysis of union wage effects. The union bargains for wages above the market level, but does not bargain over employment. Faced with higher costs of labor, firms in unionized sectors reduce employment, which reallocates labor to lower paid less productive activities in the nonunion sector. The result is lower economic efficiency and higher inequality since otherwise similar workers now receive different pay depending on union status. Or consider labor supply analyses of unemployment insurance (UI) which predict that job losers raise their reservation wages and reduce job search, increasing unemployment. The extent to which collective bargaining and UI "distort" outcomes from what would exist in an ideal competitive market rests on the degree of responsiveness of decisionmakers to the institutionally determined incentives. If firms have high elasticity of demand for labor, the change in the allocation of labor can be considerable. If the unemployed have a high elasticity of response to unemployment benefits, they may remain jobless for long periods, which will depreciate their skills and reduce supply-side pressures on wages to clear the labor market.
Institutions also affect market outcomes by changing the maximand of decision-makers. Since optimizing conditions equate marginal benefits from an action to the marginal costs of the action, an institution that changes the marginal benefit function will alter outcomes just as does an institution that changes the marginal costs. Institutions that alter marginal benefits can affect behavior in subtle ways.
Compare for instance the predicted effects of employee ownership on labor demand relative to the predicted effects of profit sharing on demand behavior. Since both of these institutions are designed to increase the rewards to workers from capitalism, one might expect that they have similar effects on labor demand and employment, but analysis shows the opposite. In a price theoretic model of employee ownership, where the employee owned firm seeks to maximize net revenues per worker, comparative statics predicts that the firm will admit fewer members to the enterprise than a competitive firm would hire. Even more striking, the employee-owned firm will reduce employment when the price of output rises. This is because lower employment raises net revenues per worker when prices rise. But this is not the end of the story. The employee-owned firm can make more for its members by hiring additional workers without giving them ownership in the firm. By doing this, the employee owned firm will employ the same number of workers and respond similarly to prices as a competitive firm while creating a dual class of workers, employee-owners and standard wage-employees.
By contrast, consider labor demand by a profit-maximizing firm that shares profits with workers by paying them a fixed proportion of profits rather than fixed wages. Weitzman (1984) has shown that when a firm pays workers a fixed share of profits per worker, the firm seeks to hire more workers than would a competitive firm. In fact, the firm always tries to hire more workers, giving it an infinite demand for labor. Each additional worker adds to sales and profits, just as an additional commissioned salesperson adds to the profits of a marketing firm even if it cannibalizes some sales from existing salespersons. The firm's employment is limited by workers' alternative opportunities rather than by the cost of labor to the firm. As a result profit sharing can maintain full employment in the face of adverse economic shocks. To the extent that Japan's bonus compensation system -which pays of 4-6 months of earnings via winter and summer bonuses --operates as profit-sharing (Freeman and Weitzman, 1986) , this can help explain Japan's more rapid recovery from economic shocks than countries that pay fixed wages.
Employee ownership and profit sharing also affect supply behavior. Most proponents of these institutions favor them because they give greater incentives to workers to work hard than do fixed wages.
But to succeed, these modes of compensation must overcome the "free rider" problem -the incentive that each worker has to shirk and live off the effort of other employees when all workers share the fruits of any individual's extra effort. In an N employee workplace this is often called the 1/N problem since the worker gets only 1/Nth of the reward for their effort. Overcoming the free rider problem may require institutions -work groups of different types, weekly team meetings and discussion of work problems -and a "participative" corporate culture that complements the incentive system.
The bottom line is that by influencing both demand and supply, institutions have the potential for impacting the aggregate economy.
Institutions do not matter
Models of efficient bargaining predict that when firms/workers engage in bargaining, they "leave no money on the table" and thus make the same decisions as a profit-maximizing firm. This is the Coase Theorem at work in the world of labor institutions (Freeman, 1993b) . As long as transactions costs are negligible and someone has clear property rights to decisions, the bargaining parties produce efficiently and agree over some division of the rewards from their joint effort. The analysis suggests that institutionally determined rules, such as employment protection legislation, which some blame for European high unemployment by making firms leery of hiring workers they cannot readily lay off in the future in fact have no effect on employment. In the efficient bargaining model, the firm makes the efficient layoff regardless of whether the worker or the firm "owns" the job. What EPL does is alter the division of the profits from the efficient choice. With EPL the firm pays some of the profit from a layoff to the worker to induce the worker to leave. Absent EPL the firm gets all of the profit from the decision.
In this model, institutions alter the distribution of income but not the efficiency of production.
When market forces are so constraining that firms must choose profit-maximizing outcomes or go out of business, institutional arrangements affect neither distribution nor efficiency. If a firm has a Ushaped average cost curve and operates in a competitive market with free entry and exit, it either produces at the bottom of the U-shaped curve or loses money and goes out of business. The need to make nonzero or positive profits dictates decisions. Models of "zero intelligent agents" (Gode and Sunder, 1993 ) -computer code that randomly selects the amount produced or price charged subject to the profits constraint --show the power of the profits constraint to produce competitive equilibrium rapidly absent any optimizing behavior. This argument has been applied to the adverse impact of employee ownership on employment. If an employee-owned firm makes large profits and limit entry, the workers whom the firm does not admit have an incentive to form a new firm and enter the market. As a result a market with worker-owned firms ends up in the same long run equilibrium as a market with profit-seeking firms. The logic also dictates that union wage effects do not persist over time, since the firm that pays a higher wage cannot survive competition from lower cost competitors. When firms do not have "rents" to share with workers, institutions cannot affect distribution.
Situations when institutions improve outcomes
Institutions can increase information and communication flows inside firms, which can in turn improve decisions by management and labor (Freeman and Lazear, 1995) . Unions or works councils, for instance, can facilitate the flow of information from workers to management because they give workers some control over how the firm uses the information that workers provide. These institutions can also increase the flow of information from management to workers by bargaining for open books, which raises the likelihood that workers will give wage concessions when the firm is truly in crisis and avoid being fooled into doing so when the firm cries "wolf" while continuing to earn profits. In addition, workers with grievances will use firm-level institutions of voice to resolve problems rather than quit their employer, which should reduce turnover costs and lead to greater investments in firm-specific skills. In the Freeman-Lazear model, increasing the power of works councils raises output up to a point, after which increasing output falls. The reason is that in this analysis worker groups and management maximize their own income rather than their joint output, so that the worker dominated firm would shortchange capital, just as the management-dominated firm would shortchange labor.
Institutions can also improve market outcomes if they enable real markets to come closer to the competitive ideal than those markets otherwise would have done. The belief that labor markets fall short of the competitive ideal is associated with evidence that the wages of workers in the same local labor market and occupation vary widely rather than cluster tightly around a single market wage. This result, found in diverse US data sets over the years greatly impressed US institutional economists (Slichter, 1950; Dunlop, 1956) . To the extent that the large dispersion in pay reflects a failure of the competitive labor market to establish a single price of labor, institutionally determined reductions in dispersion could bring the market closer to the competitive ideal. Institutions can also make the dynamics of wage-setting closer to the competitive model. Looking at changes over time in pay across industries, analysts have noted that changes in countries with centralized bargaining more closely resemble the predictions of the competitive model than changes in the market-driven US. The competitive model predicts that exogenous changes in industrial productivity change the price of output but do not affect wages in an industry; while exogenous changes in output prices raise output and employment but also do not affect wages (Council of Economic Advisors, 1962; Salter 1960) . These predictions hold in the Nordic countries where centralized or coordinated bargaining link wages to national economic conditions rather than to sectoral conditions but do not hold in the US, where changes in wages depend substantively on changes in sectoral prices and productivity (Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991; Teulings and Hartog, 1998 ).
At the macro-level, the case for institutions is that they deal better with macro-economic problems, such as inflation and balance of payments difficulties, than decentralized labor markets. The Nordic
Model of the open macro-economy posits that peak level unions and employers' associations negotiate changes in wages equal to productivity growth in traded sectors and changes in world prices for those goods, which maintains fixed exchange rates (Aukrust, 1977; Milner and Wadensjö, 2001) . By contrast, wage-setting in local labor markets risks inflationary spirals, with wage increases in non-traded sectors inducing wage increases in the traded goods sector that exceed productivity growth and increases in global prices for the traded goods. Mancur Olson (1990) In sum, there are arguments that institutions raise efficiency, reduce efficiency, and have no effect on outcomes beyond distribution. To determine which arguments are valid for which institutions under which economic conditions requires evidence on the actual link between institutions and outcomes, to which I turn next. Since cross-country differences in performance motivate many studies of labor institutions, it is natural that the first wave of empirical analysis examined the cross section relation between institutional arrangements and economic outcomes. These studies reported that countries with neo-corporatist arrangements did better in adjusting to the economic problems of the 1980s than countries with more market oriented labor markets (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Crouch, 1985; Tarantelli, 1986) . But it is difficult to make strong statements about the effects of wage-setting institutions from cross-country data.
III. Institutions and Outcomes in Practice
Countries differ in many other dimensions and policies. Maybe income tax policy, or employment protection legislation, or product market regulations, or unemployment benefits rather than wage-setting mechanisms underlie differences in aggregate outcomes. Since the number of advanced countries is small relative to the number of institutions or policies, it hard to estimate effects for particular institutions. This institutional change produced a particular outcome in one country, moreover, it is uncertain that it will produce the same outcome elsewhere. Institutions that work one way in one country may work differently in another country where it interacts with other institutions. Enact a law on temporary contracts in Spain and new entrants are hired under those contracts. Enact a similar law in Germany, and firms continue to hire apprentices for permanent jobs. To the extent that labor institutions form a unified consistent system, one cannot simply extrapolate the effects of changing a single institution in one labor system to another.
A third type of study compares outcomes between workers covered by different labor institutions within countries in which such intra-country differences exist. The virtue of this approach is that it holds fixed the factors that affect an economy in its entirety. Making within-country comparisons of union and non-union workers is how economists study the effects of unions in countries where union and non-union arrangements coexist-such as in the Anglo-American countries (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Lewis, 1963) . Such comparisons measure differences between institutionally determined and market determined outcomes but do not necessarily identify the structural impact of the institutions. They miss the potential spillover of institutionally determined outcomes on other workers, who can be helped or harmed depending on the nature of the interaction between the sectors.
In sum, determining how institutions affect outcomes across countries is difficult. Findings must be put through several sieves -cross section analysis, before/after analyses, within country analyses, and over different time periods -before one can hazard a generalization.
One strong finding and some problematic results
For all of the difficulties in pinning down the impact of institutions on aggregate economic performance across countries, analyses have found that institutions have a major impact on one important outcome: the distribution of income. As Exhibit 3 shows, countries that rely on institutions to set wages and working conditions have lower rates of inequality or dispersion of earnings -here measured by the ratio of the pay of persons in the 90 th percentile of wages and salaries relative to the pay of persons in the 10 th percentile -and lower levels of overall income inequality -here measured by the Gini coefficient for total income. The US, which ranks as the most market-driven labor market, has the highest dispersion of wages and the highest Gini. Other economies with relatively market-driven labor markets also have high levels of inequality. By contrast, Norway, where institutions set wages, has the lowest dispersion.
Studies that look at dispersion of pay when institutions change, ranging from declines in collective bargaining coverage as in the US or UK to the breakdown of centralized negotiations between the major union federation and major employer association in Sweden or the end of the Scala Mobile mode of centralized wage setting in Italy (Manacorda, 2005) , show a comparable pattern. Movement toward market-determined pay widens earnings distributions. Movement toward more institutional wage determination narrows earnings inequality. Within country data on the level of dispersion in union and nonunion workplaces, also shows that inequalities are smaller in union settings and decline among workers who shift from nonunion jobs to union jobs; and increase among workers who move in the other direction (Card, Lemieux, Riddell, 2004; Freeman, 1984) . What is true of collective bargaining also holds for government-mandated wage payments and taxation. Minimum-wage laws raise pay at the bottom of the distribution and are generally associated with lower dispersion of earnings.
By contrast, despite considerable effort, researchers have not pinned down the effects, if any, of institutions on other aggregate economic outcomes, such as unemployment and employment. This statement may seem surprising in light of the numerous policy pronouncements in the 1990s and 2000s
that particular market-oriented changes would raise employment. The OECD Jobs Study was accompanied by two volumes of supporting research and followed by studies and reviews of studies, many given in the OECD's annual Employment Outlook (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1994) . Nickell (1997) with various co-authors and diverse other economists estimated the effect of institutions on outcomes and asserted that they had nailed it down: In the January 2005 Economic Journal Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) summarized this work with the claim that "the broad movements in unemployment in the OECD can be explained by shifts in labor market institutions" (p 1).
But as economists have examined the evidence more critically, they have rejected these strong claims in favor of a more cautious stance about what the evidence shows about the impact of institutions on aggregate economic outcomes. Baker et al. (2005) documented that the time series models on which the OECD and independent researchers have relied to support their diagnosis that institutions adversely affect aggregate outcomes are not robust. The estimated coefficients on labor institutions become statistically insignificant with modest changes in the measures of institutions, countries covered, and time period. Models that cover more years, countries, and measures than the early studies did "provide little support for those who advocate comprehensive deregulation of OECD labor markets" (p 106). Baker et al conclude that there is a "yawning gap between the confidence with which the case for labor market deregulation has been asserted and the evidence that the regulating institutions are the culprits" (p 198).
Earlier Blanchflower (2001) told a similar story, noting "only a weak positive relation in the OECD between unemployment and benefits (p 390) and "no support (from a 1999 OECD report) ... for the belief that unions, benefits, the tax wedge, ALMP (Active labor market programs) spending or earnings dispersion influence unemployment ... contrary to the claims made in Layard et al. (1994) , which appear to be based on mis-specified cross-country unemployment regressions (p 392)". Assessing results in the mid 2000s, Howell et al. (2006) and Baccaro and Rei (2005) come to a similar conclusion.
Given these studies and its own work, the OECD has backed away from the strong claims of the early 1990s. The 2004 OECD Employment Outlook argued for "the plausibility (my italics) of the Jobs Strategy diagnosis that excessively high aggregate wages and/or wage compression have been impediments" to jobs, while admitting that "this evidence is somewhat fragile", and that the effect of collective bargaining "appears to be contingent upon other institutional and policy factors that need to be clarified to provide robust policy advice" (p. 165). The 2006 Outlook stressed that the institutions of low unemployment European countries differ greatly from those in the US and UK (table 6. 3). This implies that there is no single way to attain full employment and thus no single "peak" form of capitalism to which each country should strive (Freeman, 2000) . But the debate continues. In a study that takes account of many of the criticisms of earlier cross-country time series data, Bassanini and Duval (2006) estimated that changes in tax and labor policies explain about half of 1982-2003 changes in unemployment among countries, with tax policies playing a particularly important role.
The potential effect of employment protection legislation on employment and unemployment has attracted particular attention. Countries pass these laws to reduce layoffs and raise job security for existing workers. But by making layoffs more expensive to the firm, the laws also makes it more expensive to hire workers since the firm must factor in the greater expense of layoffs if it has to reduce output. The net effect of employment protection laws on aggregate employment thus depends on the degree to which they reduce layoffs compared to the degree to which they reduce hires. After over two decades of analysis, the consensus from studies of aggregate country data is that the regulations have little effect on the overall rate of unemployment. Rather, EPL shifts unemployment from older workers to younger jobseekers (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004) . Micro-economic studies of the effect of EPL for
Chile show little evidence of a negative impact on labor demand but find that EPL increases the withinfirm gap between the marginal revenue product of labor and the wage, which it should since it creates a wedge between marginal product and the wage cost of employment (Petrin et al., 2006) .
The disappearing inverse U
In the 1980s the pattern of unemployment among OECD countries changed. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment was lower in countries with highly centralized bargaining systems than in countries with decentralized wage-setting systems, in the 1980s unemployment was lower in both of those groups than in countries with collective bargaining institutions between the extremes, at least according to some measures of wage-setting institutions (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) . There is, moreover, logic to this pattern. Market wage setting presumably attains low unemployment through competitive pressures on firms and workers while centralized wage setting attains low unemployment by forcing bargainers to consider the impacts of wages on national unemployment, among other aggregate outcomes. The "villain" in the story is industry or other intermediate level collective bargaining, which allow unions and firms to ignore the effects of their decisions on the aggregate economy (someone else pays the bulk of the unemployment compensation for workers whose jobs are lost due to high wages) and thus can produce high wages and unemployment.
But in ensuing years the inverse U relation disappeared. In the early 1990s Sweden's economic crisis reduced employment considerably. Two market-oriented economies, Canada and New Zealand, also experienced high unemployment. By contrast, the Netherlands, the archetype of a country with intermediate institutions, had modest wage settlements and altered some of its benefits to increase employment (Teulings and Hartog, 1998) . Some other European countries, including those with industry bargaining, improved their economic performance. In its 2004 review, the OECD reported no indication of an inverse U in cross-country comparisons of wage institutions and unemployment in the 1990s. Rather, the data showed wide variation in aggregate outcomes among countries classified as highly centralized, decentralized, and intermediate that belies any simple generalization even in the earlier periods (OECD, 2004, table 3.6) . Soskice (1990) pointed out that analyses that adjust measures of wage setting for coordination of bargaining in countries with industry wide bargaining produced no inverse-U even in the 1980s. The inverse-U appears to be more of a historical description of patterns at one period of time, rather than any general rule about the link between institutions and outcomes.
In short, the evidence is that institutions reduce inequality but have uncertain or time varying impacts on other aggregate outcomes, including those likely to be affected by wages.
IV. Interpretation
There are three possible interpretations of this evidence. First, it could be that labor institutions impact other outcomes substantially which extant measures of institutions and aggregate cross section time series data are too weak to identify. From this perspective, the OECD's continual improvement of measures of institutions and the passage of time will eventually pin down the true relations. Doing more of the same with better and longer time series will surely add to our knowledge, but I am dubious that it will definitively uncover institutional effects beyond those on the dispersion of pay. Analyses of micro data sets that focus on measuring labor practices -such as the UK's Workplace Employment
Relations Survey (WERS) -offer a better chance for illuminating how institutions operate on the ground and their impact on outcomes. Adding measures of labor policies and practices to matched employeeemployer panel data sets would create even greater potential for increasing knowledge. It would allow researchers to compare the behavior of the same worker under different practices, the effect of practices on selectivity of workers, and the effects of practices on productivity. Studies of firms that change labor practices (ideally under experimental conditions) or operate differently across countries due to countryspecific rules and norms could also illuminate how institutions or policies work at workplaces.
The second possible interpretation of empirical results is that the effects of institutions on outcomes changes over time due to changes in the economic environment or to changes in institutional responses to particular economic stimuli. The rough stability between US and advanced European institutions from the 1950s through the early 2000s when unemployment rose in the EU relative to the US rules out any simple causal link between institutions and outcomes. If essentially unchanged institutions caused this change in unemployment and other outcomes, the impact of institutions must have changed over time (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2004; Lundquist and Sargent, 1998, 2004; OECD, 2006 (Jackson, 2001 ).
Theories of behavior under different bargaining rules could help illuminate the conditions under which European social dialogue institution can yield efficient bargains and direct attention at institutional reforms that would increase the potential for Coase-theorem bargains (Freeman, 2006) . Finally, because labor institutions interact in ways that go beyond theory and experiments, artificial agent simulations could illuminate hypothesized interactions among institutions and between institutions and economic shocks and behavior, building on matching models of firms and workers (Neugart, 2004; Pingle and Tesfatsion, 2003) . Roth and co-workers (1999, 2000) have shown the value of combining such modelling in analyzing the market for medical residents, which seemingly works better through a centralized allocative matching algorithm than through standard competitive behavior. In the spirit of artificial agent modelling, analysts would ideally "grow" artificial economies with specified institutional arrangements (Epstein, 2005) and then simulate the effects of institutional changes on economic outcomes.
In short, because the problem of determining whether labor institutions do more than reduce income inequality; and if so, whether they improve or worsen economic outcomes is such a hard one -on par with the six blind men trying to understand the elephant --we need all of the tools at our disposal. It is only by combining insights and observations from different perspectives that we will be able to capture the institutional reality and not
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean, And prate about an Elephant Not one of them has seen! (Saxe) reacted depending on which shock they faced first, the number of treatments would increase. 
